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The role of product quality information, market state 
information and transaction costs in electronic auctions 
 
 
Abstract 
Electronic auctions have rapidly increased in popularity, but the consequences of 
switching to an electronic auction are unclear. In part this is because multiple 
changes occur at the same time so one can only observe the combined effect of 
these changes and not the effect of each separate change. For instance, electronic 
bidders face lower transaction costs, but also have less information about product 
quality and about the state of the market such as the number of bidders. In this 
paper, we report a study of bidding behavior at a large Dutch flower auction in 
which we are able to separate some of these effects. We compare electronic 
bidders with traditional bidders and when correcting for quality differences and 
seasonal effects, we find that they to bid lower on average than traditional buyers, 
as predicted by Bakos (1991, 1997). The electronic bidders were divided in two 
subgroups, internal bidders and external bidders. The external bidders had less 
product quality information and market state information than the internal bidders. 
This led the external bidders to not only bid significantly higher than the internal 
bidders, but in fact as high as the traditional bidders. Both these effects run 
counter to theoretical predictions and some possible alternative explanations are 
offered. In general, it highlights the importance of focusing the information flows 
that occur in a market. 
 
Keywords: electronic auctions, market state information, product quality information, 
transaction costs 
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1 Introduction 
An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation 
and prices on the basis of bids from participants (McAfee & McMillan 1987). One necessary 
condition for an auction to be practical is that there uncertainty over the value of the object 
being auctioned; otherwise the seller could simply set a fixed price instead. Resolving this 
uncertainty by letting auction participants bid for the object is an attractive option, but it also 
entails costs for setting up the auction and for buyers and sellers to gather in one place, i.e. 
transaction costs (Coase 1937). This means that another necessary condition for an auction to 
be practical is that the transaction costs for buyer and seller are small enough compared to the 
additional benefit they get from holding an auction instead of setting a fixed price. 
Traditionally, this meant that auctions were used primarily for high-value items such as 
paintings and construction projects or in cases where there are large fluctuations in supply 
and/or demand, such as flowers, fish and other agricultural products. In the high-value-items 
case the potential extra gains for the seller of finding a bidder who is willing to pay a high 
price outweigh the seller’s transaction costs and the high value to the buyer outweighs his 
transaction costs. In the supply/demand-fluctuations case the transaction costs for a single, 
isolated auction would be too large compared to the modest value of agricultural products, but 
holding many auctions in a short period of time lowers the transaction costs for buyers 
enough to make participation feasible. 
 
Enter the Internet. With its open standards, relatively low entry barriers and low cost of 
communication, the Internet makes gathering people in one place a lot cheaper. Instead of 
having to physically gather in one place to bid, bidders can now gather electronically via 
newsgroups, email lists and webpages. Electronic bidding removes a large part of the 
transaction costs associated with traditional auctions and as a consequence, auctions have 
sprung up everywhere. The posterchild of electronic auctions is eBay, which now has nearly 
40 million registered users, hosts over 3 million auctions each day and the total value of 
goods traded through eBay approached 10 billion in 2001 (www.ebay.com). While eBay 
focuses particularly on the consumer market (consumer-to-consumer (C2C) and business-to-
consumer (B2C)), in the last two years the business-to-business (B2B) market has grown 
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significantly and is now dwarfing the consumer market in size. Companies such as 
FreeMarkets, e-Steel, ChemConnect, VerticalNet, FastParts and numerous others have set up 
auctions aimed at improving the purchasing processes in the supply chain. Although such 
ventures are receiving a lot of enthusiasm in the business press (and for a while on the stock 
market as well), it is an open question what auction models will be successful in the long run, 
because the consequences for the various stakeholders involved of using electronic auctions 
are unclear. A first step towards progress on these issues can be made by looking in more 
detail at the differences between a traditional auction and an electronic one. 
 
A move from traditional trading to an electronic auction entails several changes. One such 
change is in the product representation, in other words how product quality information is 
made available through ICT. Previous research (Koppius, van Heck & Wolters, 1998, 
forthcoming) showed that a reduction in product quality information led to bidders lowering 
their bid to compensate for the increased quality uncertainty online. This paper deals with a 
second change, namely the fact that buyers no longer have to physically gather in one place to 
bid like in a traditional auction. This physical gathering can be very cumbersome and leads to 
high transaction costs because the buyers have to incur extra time and travel costs to get to the 
auction hall. One strategy that auction houses use to reduce transaction costs is to allow mail-
in bids or phone bids: with mail-in bids, bidders can privately announce their highest bid (i.e. 
their willingness-to-pay) to the auctioneer before the auction, who then conducts the auction 
as if the bidder were present in the room. In the case of phone bids, bidders can also stay on 
the phone with the auction hall during the auction. That way they can bid just as if they were 
physically there, except for the fact that they cannot see the actual product and the other 
bidders. Both mail-in and phone bidding reduce the transaction costs of the auction for such 
bidders.  
 
Essentially, electronic bidding through new ICT forms such as the Web and email are new 
variants on the phone bidding principle. However, an added advantage of electronic bidding is 
that it is cheaper than phone bidding and perhaps more importantly, the information 
disadvantage of phone bidding can be countered to some extent through electronic product 
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representation, although nullifying this information disadvantage is by no means easy 
(Koppius, van Heck & Wolters 1998, forthcoming). One aspect of phone, mail or electronic 
bidders remains though: such bidders do have an information disadvantage compared to the 
bidders in the auction hall. For instance, they cannot see how many bidders there are, they 
cannot see if specific bidders are present or not and they cannot hear the level of excitement 
or ‘buzz’ (Coval & Shumway 2000) of the auction. These types of information belong to what 
more generally can be called market state information, which can be defined as public, non-
transaction signals that influence trader behavior and such information can have a significant 
impact on market processes (Coval & Shumway 2000). The literature on electronic markets to 
date has particularly investigated the consequences of lower transaction costs (Bakos 1997), 
but the discussion above suggests that the changes in market state information available to 
traders in electronic markets compared to traditional markets should be taken into account as 
well.  
 
These two aspects will be investigates in this paper in a study of an ICT initiative called KOA 
(‘Kopen Op Afstand’, which means ‘Buying From A Distance’) at a large Dutch flower 
auction. In the KOA system, bidders had the option to bid from their offices, using special 
software and an ISDN linkup to the computer in the auction hall. These electronic bidders, or 
KOA-bidders, participated in the exact same auctions that the bidders in the auction hall itself 
were bidding on, so electronic bidders and physical bidders were competing against each 
other. This allows a direct comparison between electronic bidding behavior and traditional 
bidding behavior. The next paragraph describes the theoretical background regarding the 
differences between traditional and electronic bidding behavior. Paragraph 3 describes the 
KOA initiative. Paragraph 4 provides the data, model and methodology. Paragraph 5 
describes the results of the statistical analysis, which are discussed in paragraph 6 and 
paragraph 7 concludes. 
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2 Theoretical background 
The literature on electronic markets has its roots in the seminal work of Malone, Yates & 
Benjamin (1987) who discuss how ICT influences the choice of coordination mechanism, i.e. 
the electronic markets vs. electronic hierarchies debate. One of the factors influencing the 
choice of coordination mechanism in their analysis is the complexity of product description 
and they argued that databases and high-bandwidth electronic communication enable markets 
to effectively communicate more complex product descriptions than before, leading to lower 
transaction costs in electronic markets. 
Transaction costs were further investigated in Bakos (1991, 1997), who emphasized the 
reduced search costs for buyers in an electronic market. The most important implications of 
this search cost reduction were an improved allocative efficiency as buyers now can find 
sellers that better match their needs and a reduction in prices paid, due to increased 
competition between sellers. This ‘reduced price hypothesis’ has found mixed empirical 
support. Lee (1998) investigated the case of Aucnet, an electronic auction for second-hand 
cars in Japan and found that prices in the Aucnet auction were significantly higher than the 
traditional car auctions and offered several explanations for this phenomenon. The most 
important explanation is that because Aucnet screened out the low-quality cars (i.e. the 
‘lemons’, Akerlof (1970)) through their quality rating system, their cars were on average of 
higher quality than the traditional car auctions. Subsequent analysis (Lee, Westland & Hong 
1999) showed that correcting for the quality difference did decrease the price difference, but 
did not eliminate it.  Thus other factors have to be taken into account to explain the price 
difference. One of these is again related to Aucnet’s quality rating system: besides screening 
out the lemons, the general thoroughness of Aucnet’s car inspection process increased the 
trust that bidders had in the quality of the cars being auctioned, which leads to higher prices 
(see also Lee & Clark (1997)). Another factor is that the electronic representation of the cars 
made it attractive for sellers to sell their cars through Aucnet so they could avoid the high 
transportation and parking costs of physical auctions. This wider assortment attracted more 
buyers and this buyer externality leads to higher prices, which in turn again attracts more 
sellers and so on. A final factor may be that it is the premium that buyers are willing to pay 
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for not having to physically travel to an auction and for having a higher chance of finding a 
vehicle that best matches their preferences.  
 
Bailey (1998) also found higher prices online when he compared prices for books, CDs and 
software online and offline, as well as larger price dispersion online. These findings were 
particularly surprising as these categories are considered to be homogeneous goods, for which 
the reduced price effects theoretically should be most forceful (Bakos 1997). A likely 
explanation for this was the immature state of electronic commerce at the time of data 
collection (early 1997). Around that time, competition among Internet retailers was not very 
strong because few retailers were active on the Internet and the average Internet user had an 
above-average income and therefore may have been less price-sensitive (Bailey 1998), which 
would enable retailers to sustain higher prices. Other potential explanations are high search 
costs on the Internet due to information overload and the possibility of price discrimination by 
retailers.  
In a follow-up study on books and CDs, Brynjolfsson & Smith (2000) improved Bailey’s data 
collection methodology in order to arrive at a more accurate price comparison. They do find 
the predicted lower prices on the Internet (8-15% difference) and also much smaller price 
adjustments by Internet retailers, both of which are indications of a more efficiently 
functioning market. However, they still replicate Bailey’s (1998) finding of substantial price 
dispersion online, even larger price dispersion online than among conventional retailers, 
which again runs counter to the hypothesis of an efficient market (in the case of homogeneous 
goods). They note that models of search costs or asymmetric information cannot explain this 
finding and suggest that heterogeneity among retailers, particularly on issues related to trust 
and branding, could account for the observed price dispersion (Brynjolfsson & Smith 2000). 
Other possible explanations are price discrimination (Clemons, Hann & Hitt 2000), switching 
costs (Chen & Hitt 2000) and convenience and awareness (Smith, Bailey & Brynjolfsson 
1999). 
 
Degeratu, Rangaswamy & Wu (2000) took a different approach when they compared 
shopping behavior in a traditional supermarket with shopping behavior at Peapod, an online 
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supermarket. They distinguished four categories of search attributes of a product: brand name, 
price, sensory attributes (product attributes that can be determined through the senses), and 
non-sensory attributes (product attributes that can be described accurately in words). Focusing 
on consumer choice behavior and using information integration theory, they found that 
sensory attributes have lower impact on choices online, whereas non-sensory attributes have 
higher impact. Brand name also has a higher impact on online choice, but only if there is less 
attribute information available online than offline. Online consumers are more sensitive to 
price, but this is mainly due to the strong effect of online promotions. Once this is taken into 
account, online consumers are less price-sensitive than offline consumers.  
Lynch & Ariely (2000) also investigated the price-sensitivity of online consumers in relation 
to the search process. In an experimental environment of two competing online wine stores, 
they manipulated the search costs for price information and for quality information, as well as 
the ease of cross-store comparison. Easier cross-store comparison increased price-sensitivity 
(but only if both stores carried the wine that was searched for), but the search costs for price 
information had no consistent effect. They also found that a lower cost of obtaining quality 
information led to a decrease in price-sensitivity. Although the relationship between price-
sensitivity and the magnitude of the search costs is dependent on the product being sold, their 
results do suggest that all three types of search costs need to be taken into account, as there is 
a tradeoff between them. More generally, this implies that comparison-shopping (as enabled 
by software agents or other intermediaries) does not inevitably lead to an all-out price war as 
predicted by some (Sinha 2000) when the quality information of differentiated products is 
readily available. 
 
 
3 The Dutch flower auctions and the KOA initiative 
Dutch flower auctions use a clock for price discovery as follows. The computerized auction 
clock in the room provides the buyers with product characteristics such as stemlength or 
diameter or number of leaves (dependent on the particular flower type), as well as information 
on the producer, unit of currency, quality and minimum purchase quantity. The flowers are 
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transported in different lots (the flowers in each lot have identical characteristics) through the 
front of the auction room, where there is a person (the ‘raiser’) who shows the flower to the 
more than hundred buyers in the stand. The clock hand starts at a high price determined by the 
auctioneer, and drops until a buyer stops the clock by pushing a button. The auctioneer asks 
the buyer by intercom how many units of the lot he or she will buy. The buyer provides the 
number of units. The clock is then reset and the process begins for the remaining flowers, 
sometimes introducing a new minimum purchase quantity, until all units of the lot are sold 
and the auction starts for the next lot. In practice, it turns out that the Dutch flower auction is 
an extremely time-efficient auction mechanism: it handles one transaction every four seconds 
on average. 
 
Traditionally, bidders have to be physically present in the auction hall in order to bid. The 
KOA initiative started as a pilot-project with electronic bidding. Initially it was offered to a 
few large buyers, who were expected to be the most likely early adopters for two reasons. One 
reason was that the KOA system required a significant investment in hardware and software: 
a dedicated computer, a double ISDN line to the auction hall as well as monthly fees to use 
system. The other reason was that the auction expected that buyers would be able to save on 
purchasing personnel costs, as the KOA system allowed buyers to efficiently monitor all the 
13 auction clocks that run in parallel. Traditionally, large buyers needed to have several 
buyers present, one or more in each of the five auction halls to be able to do this monitoring 
efficiently. One of the expectations of the KOA system was that buyers would be able to do 
the same purchasing with one or two less purchasing personnel, which would offset the costs 
of the system. Interviews with KOA buyers indicated that such cost reductions did indeed 
occur. 
In the KOA system, buyers did not see the actual flower (or a generic picture), but otherwise 
they did see the same information they would see if they were in the auction hall, i.e. 
information about upcoming auctions, minimum lot size, the supplier and various lot 
characteristics. They had a picture of the auction clock on their screen that was synchronized 
with the auction clock in the auction hall. Bidding was done by pressing the space bar. 
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The KOA system quickly became a success as the benefits became obvious: several of the 
buyers saved significantly on personnel costs and all buyers were enthusiastic about the fact 
that they did not need to travel to the auction at early in the morning (auctioning starts at 
6am). Another frequently mentioned benefits was the increased market monitoring 
capabilities that the system offered, not just for this particular flower auction, but also in 
combination with a similar KOA-type system from a large rival auction. The rollout of the 
system was subsequently expanded to mid-size buyers as well.  
Not all KOA-users were alike though: several buyers (particularly the larger ones) had an 
office on the auction complex itself, in addition to their regular office. These internal buyers 
could also use the KOA system from those offices. This meant that they had the option, like 
the traditional buyers, to walk through the flower warehouse in the morning and physically 
judge the quality of the flowers and then return to their (internal) office to bid through KOA. 
In those internal offices they also had access to the security camera system, which enabled 
them to monitor activity in the auction hall. This way they could for instance see what had 
happened if there was a disruption in the auction process, but also they could see the number 
of bidders present in the auction hall. The external KOA buyers did not have this market state 
information as they did not have an office on the auction complex. To account for this 
difference we will distinguish between internal and external KOA buyers in the analysis in the 
next paragraphs. 
 
Summarizing, KOA buyers had lower transaction costs compared to their traditional 
counterparts, but within the group of KOA-buyers, the external buyers had lower transaction 
costs than the internal buyers. With respect to the availability of market state information, the 
situation is reversed: traditional buyers have the most market state information, followed by 
the internal buyers and then the external buyers. The tradeoff between these two effects will 
be analyzed in the next paragraph. 
 
In principle there is another change for the KOA-buyers compared to the traditional buyers 
and that is the electronic product representation as opposed to the physical showing of the 
flower by the raiser. As Koppius et al. (1998, forthcoming) showed in their analysis of screen 
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auctioning for the flower type Anthurium at the same flower auction, switching to electronic 
product representation reduced the product quality information available to bidders, which 
caused a price drop. Screen auctioning was introduced a year before the KOA initiative, so for 
Anthuriums the traditional buyers in the auction hall did not have the advantage of seeing the 
physical product during the auction itself. They still had the option of going into the 
warehouse before the auction started to inspect the flowers, but so had the internal KOA 
buyers. As we focus on the Anthurium type in this analysis, the product representation effect 
plays no role here when comparing traditional and internal KOA-buyers (for external KOA-
buyers it could still play a role as they could not go into the warehouse in the morning). This 
is an important methodological point, because previous studies of electronic markets could 
not distinguish between these two effects, since the effect of reduced product quality 
information on one hand occurred at the same time as the effect of lower transaction costs and 
reduced market state information on the other hand. In this study they can be separated. 
 
 
4 Data description and methodology 
To investigate the impact of KOA, we will look at bidding behavior for the flower type 
Anthurium. We will construct a regression model that predicts the price of an Anthurium with 
the type of buyer (traditional, internal KOA or external KOA) as a specific explanatory 
variable. The model will be tested on the auction transaction database, using data from the 
year 1997 and 1998. In this database for every transaction various data are kept, including 
data related to the seller, the buyer, the product (flower type, quality, stemlength and diameter 
etc.), and the transaction itself (price, quantity, date).  
Discussions with flower auction employees revealed several factors that influence the 
Anthurium price that were use as control variables in the model. For Anthuriums, diameter of 
the flower (DIAM) is an important descriptive characteristic. The day of the week (WKDAY) 
influences price as well because different days of the week have structurally different supply 
and demand characteristics. Similarly, the trade of Anthuriums (and flowers in general) is 
highly seasonally dependent. Therefore, we corrected for this seasonal effect in the regression 
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by including the average Anthurium price at all other flower auctions in Holland (VBN) as an 
extra variable. The quantity of the transaction (QUANT) is taken into account because bidders 
are expected to bid differently for large or small quantities. For each of the 9 flower subtypes 
in the database, we added a dummy variable FLWTYPEi to account for the different prices 
that different subtypes fetch. KOA was introduced in early 1997, with a second rollout phase 
in the summer of 1997. This resulted in the following model (1):  
 
PRICE = α + β1*DIAM + β2*WKDAY + β3*VBN + β4*QUANT + β5,i*FLWTYPEi + 
β6*KOA + ε.  (1) 
 
Comparing KOA-buyers as a group with traditional buyers, so not distinguishing between 
internal and external KOA-buyers, the main differences are the lower transaction costs and 
the reduced market state information for the KOA-buyers. How and how strong the latter 
factor will influence bidding behavior is initially unclear, so the main factor is presumed to 
the lower transaction costs and we will first test the following hypothesis based on Bakos 
(1991, 1997): 
 
Hypothesis 1:  KOA buyers will bid less than traditional buyers, i.e. β6<0. 
 
We then constructed a second model (2) in which the KOA dummy was replaced by two 
dummies KOAEXT and KOAINT, to indicate if the buyer was an external KOA buyer or an 
internal KOA buyer. If both dummies were zero, the buyer was a traditional buyer in the 
auction hall. So in this analysis there were three groups of buyers. 
 
PRICE = α + β1*DIAM + β2*WKDAY + β3*VBN + β4*QUANT + β5,i*FLWTYPEi + 
β6*KOAINT  + β7*KOAEXT + ε.   (2) 
 
External KOA-buyers faced lower transaction costs, less product quality information and less 
market state information than traditional buyers. Internal KOA buyers had the same product 
quality information as traditional buyers, but their disadvantage regarding market state 
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information (compared to traditional buyers) was less than the external KOA-buyers and they 
still had lower transaction costs than traditional buyers, so both types of KOA-buyers would 
still be expected to bid lower than traditional buyers. However, because internal KOA-buyers 
potentially had more product quality information at their disposal (if they chose to go into the 
warehouse), they could be expected to discount less for product quality uncertainty and 
therefore bid higher than external KOA buyers.  As in the previous hypothesis, the direction 
and size of the effect of reduced market state information is not specified and the main factor 
are presumed to be the transaction costs and product quality information. In short, we will test 
the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Both internal and external KOA buyers will bid less than traditional buyers, 
i.e. β6<0 and β7<0. 
Hypothesis 2b: Internal KOA buyers will bid more than external KOA buyers, i.e. β6>β7. 
 
 
 
 
5 Results 
The two models above were tested on 81,803 transactions for Anthuriums using sequential 
OLS regression with two blocks of variables. The first block contained all the control 
variables: VBN-price, diameter, length, quantity and dummies for flowertype and day of the 
week. The second block contained the variable(s) of interest, KOA in the first model, 
KOAINT and KOAEXT in the second model.  
The reason for choosing this sequential regression approach is a theoretical one. The order in 
which variables are entered into the regression equation can drastically affect the 
interpretation of the results for individual independent variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001, 
131-139), which can affect the correct testing of hypothesis. If the goal of this model was to 
simply construct the best possible model for explaining the price of flowers, a stepwise 
regression approach could have sufficed. In that case the individual contributions of 
independent variables are of less importance than when hypothesis testing is the goal of the 
model. Therefore, although we could have estimated the model in a single regression step, it 
is more appropriate to use a two-step approach with the main variable entering after all 
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control variables are entered. This ensures that the added effect is uniquely due to that 
variable and no captured by the control variables. 
 
Descriptive Statistics
81803 .00 715.00 173.1276 87.7969
81803 73.60 279.40 142.2774 41.6919
81803 .00 29.00 13.1417 2.8869
81803 .00 45.00 .1616 2.5085
81803 5.00 2304.00 70.8860 104.4122
81803 .00 1.00 .3229 .4676
81803
PRICE
VBN
DIAM
LENGTH
QUANT
KOA
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std.
Deviation
 
Table 1 Descriptives KOA analysis 
 
 
 
Correlations
1.000 .524** .507** .030** -.232** -.049**
. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.524** 1.000 .022** .008* -.044** .016**
.000 . .000 .022 .000 .000
.507** .022** 1.000 .045** -.219** -.038**
.000 .000 . .000 .000 .000
.030** .008* .045** 1.000 -.010** .015**
.000 .022 .000 . .004 .000
-.232** -.044** -.219** -.010** 1.000 .265**
.000 .000 .000 .004 . .000
-.049** .016** -.038** .015** .265** 1.000
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Corr.
Sig. (2-tailed)
Variables
PRICE
VBN
DIAM
LENGTH
QUANT
KOA
PRICE VBN DIAM LENGTH QUANT KOA
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
 
Table 2 Crosscorrelations KOA analysis 
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Coefficientsa
-138.910 3.343 -41.551 .000
1.065 .004 .506 266.474 .000
-.333 .138 -.010 -2.412 .016
11.084 .075 .364 148.462 .000
-.041 .002 -.049 -23.555 .000
-4.312 .468 -.020 -9.221 .000
-7.711 .499 -.034 -15.462 .000
-6.056 .755 -.016 -8.025 .000
-2.328 .457 -.011 -5.099 .000
-2.932 .368 -.016 -7.962 .000
Variables
Constant
VBN
LENGTH
DIAM
QUANT
TUESDAY
WEDNESDAY
THURSDAY
FRIDAY
KOA
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardi
zed
Coefficien
ts
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: PRIJSa. 
 
Table 3 Regression coefficients KOA analysis 
 
Table 1 contains the descriptives for the first model, table 2 its cross-correlations. Table 3 
shows the regression coefficients of the final model. This model had an adjusted R2 of 0.713, 
which did not change when the KOA variable was added in the second block. This implies 
that the contribution of KOA to the overall price model is negligible. However, the tolerance 
statistic of 0.911 shows that the KOA variable is practically orthogonal to the other variables, 
which implies that its contribution is unique and not captured by all the other variables. As 
can be seen in table 3, the coefficient for KOA is negative and significant, yielding support 
for hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 4 contains the results for the regression of the second model, with the KOA buyers split 
in internal KOA buyers (KOAINT) and external KOA buyers (KOAEXT) and it contains 
some surprising results.  
 
 16
Coefficientsa
-138.595 3.342 -41.475 .000
1.064 .004 .505 266.232 .000
11.087 .075 .365 148.571 .000
-.338 .138 -.010 -2.447 .014
-.043 .002 -.051 -24.370 .000
-4.384 .468 -.021 -9.378 .000
-7.554 .499 -.033 -15.147 .000
-6.105 .754 -.016 -8.093 .000
-2.333 .456 -.011 -5.111 .000
-5.182 .445 -.023 -11.631 .000
.097 .500 .000 .195 .845
Constant
VBN
DIAM
LENGTH
QUANT
TUESDAY
WEDNESDAY
THURSDAY
FRIDAY
KOAINT
KOAEXT
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardi
zed
Coefficien
ts
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: PRIJSa. 
 
Table 4 Regression coefficient for KOA internal/external model 
 
 
The two important coefficients are those for KOAEXT and KOAINT. The latter was negative 
as expected: -5.182. However, the KOAEXT coefficient was marginally positive and not 
significant, indicating that external KOA buyers paid the same prices as did traditional buyers. 
This means that the hypothesis 2a is only partially validated, namely only for the internal 
KOA buyers. Additionally, this means that we have to reject the hypothesis 2b, as the internal 
KOA buyers actually paid less than the external KOA buyers. 
 
6 Discussion  
The results indicate that the first hypothesis is supported, implying that KOA-buyers do 
indeed pay lower prices than traditional buyers. However, when KOA-buyers are split into 
internal and external KOA-buyers, a somewhat different picture emerges. Although the 
reduced price hypothesis is supported for internal KOA buyers, the situation for external 
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KOA buyers is rather more complicated. First of all, there is the fact that they do not differ 
significantly from traditional buyers in the auction hall (the rejection of hypothesis 2a). A 
possible explanation for this is that perhaps the external KOA buyers use the savings in 
transaction costs to pay higher prices in order to increase their chances of winning the auction. 
One setting in which this would make sense is if they have an orderbook to fill, because then 
they do not want to run the risk of not being able to deliver the flowers to their customers. 
This may be particularly so if their customers are relatively price-insensitive.  
The second surprising finding is the reversal of the expected price difference between internal 
and external KOA buyers. It was expected that the information disadvantage that external 
KOA buyers face compared to internal KOA buyers, since they were not able to physically 
inspect the flowers in the morning, would lead them to bid lower on average, analogous to the 
reasoning in Koppius et al. (1998, forthcoming). The fact that they actually pay higher prices 
than internal buyers is not easy to explain. Although internal KOA-buyers tend to be much 
larger (in terms of purchasing volume) than external KOA-buyers, it is not obvious how this 
could explain the difference, particularly since the volume of the transaction is accounted for 
in the regression model through the QUANT variable. The orderbook explanation offered 
above for the non-existence of the difference between external and traditional buyers might 
also apply here: if external KOA-buyers tend to buy more ‘on order’ than internal KOA 
buyers, they are likely to pay higher prices.  
A different explanation that does not rely on unobserved variables (such as being an 
orderbook buyer) may have to do with the effect of reduced market state information 
described earlier. When discussing the hypothesis, it was mentioned that effect direction and 
size was unclear and therefore left unspecified, but given these results, we can possibly 
reassess that statement. As mentioned in paragraph 3, internal KOA-buyers had access to the 
video security system. This gave them information that external KOA-buyers lacked. For 
instance if there was an interruption in the auctioning process, internal KOA-buyers could see 
whether this was due to a mechanical defect or other reasons. Or, information more relevant 
to their bidding behavior: internal KOA-buyers could see how many people were in the 
auction hall. This would allow them to more accurately assess the total demand than external 
KOA-buyers, who only had information about the total supply. Essentially, external KOA-
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buyers have to pay a premium to cover the increased uncertainty about demand if they still 
want to win the auction. 
 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper we empirically investigated the differences in bidding behavior between 
traditional bidders in flowers auctions and bidders who bid from their offices using an ISDN 
linkup (KOA bidders). As both types of bidders participated in the exact same auctions, this 
allows for a detailed, direct comparison between these two categories of bidders.  
The only a priori differences between the bidders are reduced transaction costs and reduced 
availability of market state information for the electronic bidders. This implies a reduction of 
transaction costs for electronic bidders, which in turn is hypothesized to lead to lower prices 
(Bakos 1991, 1997). The effect of the reduction in market state information was initially 
expected to be negligible compared to the transaction cost effect. The resulting reduced price 
hypothesis was tested using the transaction database of a large Dutch flower auction. The 
results from a regression model yield support for this hypothesis as electronic bidders do 
indeed pay lower prices.  
The electronic bidders could be split in bidders who had an office on the auction complex 
itself and bid from there (internal KOA buyers) and bidders who did not have such an office 
and therefore bid from their offices outside the auction complex (external KOA buyers). The 
internal KOA buyers had an information advantage on product quality, because they could 
inspect the flowers in the auction warehouse before the auction started and they had access to 
the security camera system, which in particular gave them some extra information about the 
number of bidders present. External KOA buyers lacked this extra market state information. A 
second model was constructed to investigate the differences between these two categories, 
where external KOA-buyers were expected to pay a lower price (as in the first model, the 
effects of reduced market state information were expected to be negligible to the main effect 
of product quality information). Results from this second regression model indicate that the 
reduced price effects found in the first model are due only to the internal KOA buyers. 
External KOA buyers pay the same prices as traditional buyers in the auction hall. This 
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implies that the benefits of lower transaction costs for external KOA buyers do not show up in 
the prices they pay and the information disadvantage they have compared to internal KOA 
buyers is of no consequence either. This runs counter to initial theoretical predictions. A 
possible explanation could be bidder heterogeneity: perhaps external KOA buyers, more so 
than internal KOA buyers, tend to buy ‘on order’. If buyers have an orderbook to fill for their 
customers and they do not want to run the risk of having to sell ‘no’, they can be expected to 
be less price-sensitive, particularly if their customers are not very price-sensitive either. This 
could result in higher prices being paid by orderbook buyers, in this case the external KOA 
buyers.  
Another explanation is that the market state information mattered much more than expected: 
because external KOA-buyers cannot see the number of bidders in the auction hall, they 
cannot assess total demand as accurately as internal KOA-buyers and therefore they have to 
pay a bid premium to account for this increased uncertainty of being able to win the auction. 
Further research is obviously needed, but it seems safe to say that the effects of reduced 
transaction costs are not as straightforward as current theory suggests, particularly when the 
effects of product quality information and market state information are taken into account. 
This paper also suggests information itself is a multidimensional construct: different types of 
information (market state information versus product quality information) have different 
effects. Aggregating those into a single dimension of information may obscure important 
underlying regularities. 
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